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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the market for video games, where some ￿rms
are active in both, the market for video games hardware and software. It is
puzzling that hardware can be easily made compatible with duplicated (i.e.
pirated) software. We ask, whether there exist strategic reasons explaining
this puzzle. Firms may, for example, enable software piracy in order to in-
crease their market shares in the hardware market. This will indeed be true,
if hardware prices are ￿xed and the market is completely covered. With en-
dogenous prices, however, price reactions to enabling of product piracy will
o⁄set the increase in market shares and copy protection will be set at the
highest possible level. If, on the other hand, the market is only partially
covered, copy protection will be strategically reduced. In doing so, hard-
ware ￿rms shift reservation prices from the software to the more important
hardware market.
Key words: Video Games Market, Product Piracy, Fundamental Trans-
formation
JEL classi￿cation: D21, L13, L86
￿I would like to thank Matthias Kr￿kel for helpful suggestions. Financial support by
the Deutsche Forschungsgemainschaft (DFG), SFB-TR 15 (Governance and the e¢ ciency
of economic systems), is gratefully acknowledged.
￿￿Oliver G￿rtler, Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauer-
allee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany. Tel.:+49-228-739214, Fax:+49-228-739210; E-mail:
oliver.guertler@uni-bonn.de
11 Introduction
The market for video games is a particularly interesting one to analyze, for
it possesses an almost unique combination of characteristics. The most re-
markable features are the following: (i) There are only a few ￿rms (Sony,
Microsoft, Nintendo, Sega) active in the market for video games consoles
(the hardware needed to play video games). These ￿rms additionally pro-
duce video games (or software) for their respective consoles. Moreover, there
are other ￿rms specializing in software production, i.e. ￿rms that are ac-
tive in the software, but not in the hardware market. (ii) Software produced
for a certain video games console is incompatible with the consoles of other
producers. Thus, there is some kind of fundamental transformation in the
video games market.1 At a ￿rst stage, consumers decide on whether or not
to buy a video games console and, in the former case, on whose console to
purchase. At this stage, all products are available for consumers. At a second
stage, hardware has been purchased or not. Customers who have bought the
video games console of a certain producer are then forced to also buy games
compatible with this console. In other words, they are no longer able (or it
is not worthwhile for them) to purchase software being only compatible with
the console of a di⁄erent producer.2 (iii) Software producers are harmed by
1The notion "fundamental transformation" was introduced by Williamson (1985) into
the theory of the ￿rm. It describes the change from perfect market competition to a
bilateral monopoly due to speci￿c investments.
2An exception are naturally customers who have purchased more than one video games
console. These customers are likely to form a small minority. Hence, for the majority of
customers, the above reasoning should apply.
2unauthorized copying of video games. Video games are presently stored on
DVDs so that it is relatively easy to produce a copy of a video game. Inter-
estingly, the use of copied software on a video games system usually requires
a modi￿cation of the respective video games console. For instance, in order
to use duplicated software on the European version of Sony￿ s Playstations, it
is necessary to install a so called Mod-Chip. The original aim of this Chip is
to make the Playstation compatible with imported software from the US and
Japan. A Mod-Chip can therefore be legally installed in every video games
shop.
As producers of video games consoles are also active in the market for
software, it seems puzzling that it is so easy to use copied software on a video
games system. Copying of software is likely to decrease pro￿ts from software
sale so why don￿ t hardware producers undertake greater e⁄ort to make dupli-
cated software incompatible with their hardware? Naturally, there might be
technological reasons that explain part of the puzzle. Yet, this does not seem
to be the whole story. In our view, there might also be strategic reasons. A
hardware producing ￿rm may, for example, enable unauthorized copying in
order to increase the demand for its console. If a consumer anticipates that
he is able to use duplicated games on a video games console, he might be
more willing to purchase the latter. Lower pro￿ts on the software market
may then be outweighed by an increase in pro￿ts from sale of hardware.
In this paper, we develop a model that analyzes, whether or not the in-
tuition behind the previous reasoning is true. We consider two ￿rms that
are producing hardware and software for the video games market. The ￿rms
3are the only hardware producers, but compete in their respective software
market with other ￿rms. The products of the single ￿rms are supposed to
be di⁄erentiated so that ￿rms achieve positive pro￿ts from product sale. In
this context, we follow the modeling approaches by Hotelling (1929) and
Salop (1979), where consumers￿tastes for the single products di⁄er. Two
main results will be derived: If market covering is complete, that is, if all
consumers in the video games market are served and if hardware prices are
￿xed, enabling of product piracy will indeed increase market shares of the
hardware producing ￿rms. With endogenous prices, however, enabling cus-
tomers to use copied software is countered by a hardware price reduction of
the other hardware producer, which completely o⁄sets the increase in mar-
ket shares. Thus, enabling of product piracy only has an adverse e⁄ect on
pro￿ts from software sale. Hardware ￿rms hence choose the highest possible
copy protection. The result will be totally di⁄erent, if market covering is
incomplete. In this case, enabling of product piracy shifts reservation prices
from the software to the hardware market. Consumers are willing to pay a
certain amount for a package of hardware and software. If they are able to
use duplicated software in combination with hardware, they are willing to
pay higher prices for the latter. As the hardware market is the more impor-
tant one for hardware producers, they gain from such a shift in reservation
prices. As a result, it pays out to set copy protection at the lowest possible
value.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section brie￿ y presents and
discusses related literature. In section 3, the main model is introduced. Sec-
4tions 4 and 5 solve the model for the case of complete market covering (section
4) and partial market covering (section 5). Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There already exists a number of papers dealing with unauthorized copying
of products.3 This literature can be roughly divided into three categories. A
￿rst strand of literature (see e.g. Hurt & Schuchman (1966), Novos & Wald-
man (1984), Johnson (1985), Belle￿ amme (2003) or Burton et al. (2005))
recognizes that higher product piracy usually leads to lower pro￿ts of the
￿rms, whose products are duplicated. This decrease in pro￿ts may yield
lower (ex ante) incentives for ￿rms to invest in technology, for piracy of the
products reduces the gains from these investments.
The papers of Liebowitz (1985), Besen (1986), Besen & Kirby (1989),
Bakos et al. (1999) and Varian (2000) argue that book or video producing
￿rms may indirectly appropriate revenues from users who are not original
purchasers. As, in these markets, libraries and video stores mostly act as a
starting point of copying activities, ￿rms indirectly appropriate revenues by
demanding higher prices from these. As a consequence, ￿rm pro￿ts in these
industries may increase due to copying.
Finally, there is some literature (see, for example, Connor & Rumelt
(1991), Takeyama (1994), Shy & Thisse (1999), Gayer & Shy (2003) or Peitz
(2004)) analyzing the role of product piracy in the presence of network e⁄ects.
3For a survey see Peitz & Waelbroeck (2003).
5Their main reasoning is the following: If the value of a certain product
increases in the number of (legal and illegal) users, product piracy might be
useful, for it leads to a higher dispersion of the product and, therefore, to an
increase in product value. This increase in product value might yield higher
pro￿ts so that ￿rms might bene￿t from product piracy.
Two remarks are necessary: First, note that previous work has not con-
sidered the market for video games. In other markets, where product piracy
is an issue, the results to be derived in this paper do not apply. This is ei-
ther because hardware producing ￿rms are not active in the software market
(e.g. software produced for personal computers) or because software is also
compatible with hardware of di⁄erent producers (e.g. Music-CDs and Film-
DVDs). Second, indirect appropriability and network e⁄ects may also play a
role in the video games market. Yet, we believe that the strategic e⁄ects we
concentrate on are of major importance in this market. In order to focus on
these e⁄ects, we abstract from indirect appropriability and network e⁄ects
considerations.
3 The model
Consider a situation with four ￿rms (indexed by i = 1;:::;4). Firms 1 and 2
are active in both, the market for video games hardware and software. Firms
3 and 4, on the other hand, are only active in the software market. Let
k1 (k2) denote the price ￿rm 1 (￿rm 2) demands for its hardware, while pi
stands for the respective software price. The software produced by ￿rms 1
6and 4 is supposed to be only usable on ￿rm 1￿ s hardware. Similarly, ￿rms 2
and 3 produce software that can only be used in combination with ￿rm 2￿ s
hardware. For simplicity and with only little loss of generality, production
of both, software and hardware, occurs at zero cost. Consumers attach no
value to hardware per se, but they value software. In this context, consumers
are supposed to di⁄er in tastes for the respective ￿rms￿products. Each
￿rm produces a di⁄erent video game and each video game is preferred by
some consumers. To capture this formally, we follow the modeling approach
by Salop (1979) and assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on
a circle with a perimeter equal to 1, with total consumer mass normalized
to 1. The four ￿rms are located on this circle as shown in Figure 1.4 The
distance between ￿rms 1 and 4 (and 2 and 3) is b > 0, while distance between
￿rms 1 and 2 (and 3 and 4) is 0:5 ￿ b. We take the ￿rms￿locations as
exogenously given. The value a consumer attaches to a video game is given
by v￿td2. v denotes the value a consumer attaches to a product that exactly
meets his taste, d is the distance5 between the consumer￿ s and the ￿rm￿ s
location measured along the circle and t is a factor indicating how strongly
product value decreases with distance from the ￿rm. The assumption that
valuation depends on quadratic distance is introduced to avoid problems with
equilibrium existence.6 Each consumer underlies some time constraint. This
4Note that the results to be derived in this paper will not change, if we exchange the
locations of ￿rms 1 and 4 and/or ￿rms 2 and 3.
5Note that "distance" should not be taken literally. It acts as a metaphor, indicating,
how much a ￿rm￿ s product di⁄ers from the consumer￿ s most preferred product.
6See, for example, D￿ Aspremont et al. (1979) or Economides (1986). In a related
model, it was respectively shown that, when distance enters in a di⁄erent way into valua-
7means that he only has enough time to play one single video game. Thus, if
a customer has acquired some game, he will never buy a second one.
Insert Figure 1 here.
It is assumed that consumers ￿rstly decide on their hardware purchases.
Thereafter, sale of software occurs. As mentioned before, purchase of hard-
ware leads to some kind of fundamental transformation: Before a consumer
buys hardware, he may choose between four di⁄erent software games. There-
after, he has only two di⁄erent products available, as the remaining two
games are incompatible with his hardware. Similarly, in the hardware mar-
ket, ￿rms compete for all consumers, while, in the software market, com-
petition is restricted to the consumers who bought appropriate hardware.
We assume that no long-term contract is feasible. That is, hardware ￿rms
cannot o⁄er a contract specifying both, purchase of hardware and a certain
software at a given price. In other words, bundling of hardware and software
is supposed to be impossible. This assumption could re￿ ect the fact that,
in practice, customers often purchase a video games console at a point in
time, where some games are already available, but many others are not yet
produced.
In the software market, ￿rms are threatened by product piracy. We model
this by assuming that, with probability q1 (q2), a consumer may receive
costless copies of all games compatible with the hardware of ￿rm 1 (2). As
a consumer receives no extra utility from possessing a second game, he will,
tion, the ￿rms￿demand functions may be discontinuous and their pro￿t functions may be
discontinuous and non-concave. Therefore, no pure-strategy price equilibrium may exist.
8in case copies compatible with the hardware are available, always copy his
most preferred game and be indi⁄erent between receiving a copy of the other
game or not. q1 and q2 are supposed to be decision variables of the hardware
producing ￿rms. Each ￿rm can design its hardware in a way that enables
more or less copying. Let q1;q2 2 [￿ q; ^ q], with 0 < ￿ q < ^ q < 1. The restriction
q1;q2 2 [￿ q; ^ q] indicates that the probability of copying also depends on actions
of outstanding parties that cannot be in￿ uenced by hardware producers. To
focus on the strategic e⁄ects of product piracy, increasing q1 or q2 is assumed
to be at no cost for the ￿rms. Further, the parameters q1 and q2 can be
observed by all parties. That is, each ￿rm and each consumer knows the
respective parameter choices.
This approach to introduce copying into the model is admittedly a very
simpli￿ed one. There are two justifying reasons. First, the important e⁄ect
of copying in this model is that a consumer￿ s expected cost for acquisition of
software declines. This e⁄ect, however, is also present in more sophisticated
models of copying as e.g. Novos & Waldman (1984) or Connor & Rumelt
(1991). Second, the model will simply be no longer tractable, if we model
copying in a more complex way.
The timing of the model is as follows: At date 1, the hardware producers
decide on q1 and q2, while, thereafter, they determine the hardware prices.
The two ￿rms act simultaneously, respectively, i.e., no ￿rm has a ￿rst-mover
advantage. At date 3, consumers decide on their hardware purchases. The
software producers determine the software prices at date 4. At date 5, nature
decides on whether copies of the games become available. Finally, at date
96, consumers decide on whether or not to buy software, and, in the former
case, on whose software to buy. We combine dates 1 to 3 to a stage 1, where
the hardware market is considered, and dates 4 to 6 to a stage 2, which deals
with choices associated with the software market.
4 Complete market covering
We begin by considering the case, where, in equilibrium, each consumer
decides to buy hardware and software (if copies are unavailable). That is,
the market is completely covered. This will be the case, if v is su¢ ciently
large compared to t. We work backwards and start at stage 2 of the model, i.e.
we consider the software market. Note that costs for hardware acquisition
are sunk and, thus, do not a⁄ect decisions at this stage. At dates 4 to
6, we usually consider two independent software markets. The ￿rst (second)
consists of those customers who bought ￿rm 1(2)￿ s hardware. In this context,
we assume that all consumers between ￿rms 1 and 4 (2 and 3) have acquired
hardware from ￿rm 1 (2)7 so that hardware ￿rms have factually been in
competition for consumers between ￿rms 1 and 2 and between ￿rms 4 and 3.
Let a denote the distance of the indi⁄erent hardware buyer between ￿rms 1
and 2 from ￿rm 1￿ s location. Then, the size of ￿rst software market is b+2a,
whereas the size of the second market is 1￿b￿2a. It is su¢ cient to analyze
￿rm and consumer behavior on the ￿rst software market. The solution for
the second market is analogous. As noted before, consumers di⁄er in their
7This is, in equilibrium, indeed true, as will be shown, when we turn to stage 1 of the
model.
10valuations for the two ￿rms￿products, i.e. we are in a setting with product
di⁄erentiation. Customers who bought the hardware of ￿rm 1 and, hence,
purchase software from either ￿rm 1 or ￿rm 4 are, as shown in Figure 2,
uniformly distributed on a line segment of length b + 2a.8 Firm 1￿ s distance
from the left end equals ￿rm 4￿ s distance from the right end and is given by
a.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Denote by z a consumer￿ s distance from the left end of the line segment.
Such a consumer has net utility u1s = v ￿ p1 ￿ t(z ￿ a)
2, if buying software
from ￿rm 1 and u4s = v ￿ p4 ￿ t(z ￿ b ￿ a)
2, if buying from ￿rm 4. Hence,
for the indi⁄erent consumer the following condition must hold
v￿p1￿t(z ￿ a)
2 = v￿p4￿t(z ￿ b ￿ a)
2 () z =
1
2bt
(p4 ￿ p1 + bt(2a + b))
(1)
Thus, z denotes the relative amount of consumers (of population size 1) who
want to acquire software from ￿rm 1. Each consumer copies his preferred









(p1 ￿ p4 + bt(2a + b))(1 ￿ q1) (3)
8Competition in the software market is therefore analogous to Hotelling￿ s model (1929)
of the "linear city".
11Maximizing these pro￿ts leads to a symmetric solution, i.e., both ￿rms choose
the same prize p1 = p4 =: p = bt(2a + b).9 Inserting this price into (2) and
(3), respectively, yields the optimal pro￿ts, which are given by ￿12 = ￿42 =
t
2 (1 ￿ q1)b(2a + b)
2. One can easily see that these pro￿ts are decreasing in
q1. This is very intuitive. The higher the probability of copying, the smaller
is the number of customers who actually pay for a product and the smaller
are pro￿ts. Further, we get the well-known results that pro￿ts are higher, the
stronger product value decreases with distance and the bigger the market.
Let us now turn to stage 1 of the model.
At this stage, each consumer has to decide on whether or not to buy hard-
ware. In the former case, the consumer additionally has to decide on whose
hardware to buy. Divide the circle horizontally into two halves and consider
a consumer being located in the lower half. Such a consumer will, at the
model￿ s second stage, buy software from either ￿rm 1 or ￿rm 2.10 Let y denote
his distance from the left end of the lower half of the circle. His net utilities,
if buying from ￿rm 1 (2), are then given by u1h = v￿k1￿(1 ￿ q1)bt(2a + b)￿
t(y ￿ 0:5b)
2 ￿
u2h = v ￿ k2 ￿ (1 ￿ q2)bt(1 ￿ b ￿ 2a) ￿ t(0:5 ￿ 0:5b ￿ y)
2￿
. The
net utility consists of gross utility
￿
v ￿ t(y ￿ 0:5b)
2 or v ￿ t(0:5 ￿ 0:5b ￿ y)
2￿
from playing the video game minus expected costs for hardware (k1 or k2)
and software ((1 ￿ q1)bt(2a + b) or (1 ￿ q2)bt(1 ￿ b ￿ 2a)) acquisition. For
the indi⁄erent consumer, u1h must equal u2h. We thus have the following
9Notice that here, as well as in all maximization problems that follow, the second-order
conditions are met.
10This is a consequence of the second-stage solution￿ s symmetry.
12condition:11
a =
t ￿ 4b2t + 4(k2 ￿ k1) ￿ 4btq2 (1 ￿ b) + 4b2tq1
4t + 8bt ￿ 8bt(q1 + q2)
(4)
As the demand for ￿rm 1￿ s (￿rm 2￿ s) hardware equals b + 2a (1 ￿ b ￿ 2a),
the two ￿rms￿overall pro￿ts (that is, the sum of the pro￿ts from hardware




t ￿ 4b2t + 4(k2 ￿ k1) ￿ 4btq2 (1 ￿ b) + 4b2tq1








t ￿ 4b2t + 4(k2 ￿ k1) ￿ 4btq2 (1 ￿ b) + 4b2tq1




1 ￿ b ￿
t ￿ 4b2t + 4(k2 ￿ k1) ￿ 4btq2 (1 ￿ b) + 4b2tq1








1 ￿ b ￿
t ￿ 4b2t + 4(k2 ￿ k1) ￿ 4btq2 (1 ￿ b) + 4b2tq1
2t + 4bt ￿ 4bt(q1 + q2)
￿2
Before turning to a derivation of the optimal hardware prices, it is worthwhile
to look at the e⁄ects a change in q1 (q2) has on the pro￿t of ￿rm 1 (2). For
￿xed hardware prices, an increase in q1 a⁄ects ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿t in two ways. On
the one hand, it a⁄ects the demand for the ￿rm￿ s hardware and, indirectly,
for its software. As @a
@q1 > 0;12 higher copy protection leads to lower demand.
Customers realize that their expected costs from software acquisition increase
and so change to the competitor. On the other hand, higher copy protection
leads to higher pro￿t from software sale since more customers buy software
instead of copying it.
Let us now analyze, whether or not the e⁄ects will change, if we endog-
enize hardware prices. Both ￿rms determine their hardware price such that
11Note that, for the indi⁄erent consumer, y = 0:5b + a.
12A proof of this statement is placed in the Appendix.
13the overall pro￿t is maximized. Solving the maximization-problems leads to
the subsequent ￿rst-order conditions:
0 = t + 2bt + 4k2 ￿ 8k1 ￿ 4btq2 (7)
￿
4(1 ￿ q1)bt(t + 2bt + 4k2 ￿ 4k1 ￿ 4btq2)
2t + 4bt ￿ 4bt(q1 + q2)
0 = t + 2bt + 4k1 ￿ 8k2 ￿ 4btq1 (8)
￿
4(1 ￿ q2)bt(t + 2bt + 4k1 ￿ 4k2 ￿ 4btq1)
2t + 4bt ￿ 4bt(q1 + q2)
Solving these ￿rst-order conditions simultaneously, one can show that the op-
timal hardware prices satisfy k1 = 0:5t(0:5 ￿ bq2) and k2 = 0:5t(0:5 ￿ bq1).
The optimal pro￿ts can then be derived by inserting the hardware prices into
the pro￿t functions. Pro￿ts are given by ￿1 = 0:125t(1 + b ￿ 2bq2 ￿ bq1) and
￿2 = 0:125t(1 + b ￿ 2bq1 ￿ bq2). Considering these pro￿ts, it is straightfor-
ward to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Both ￿rms choose qi at its lowest possible value, i.e. q1 =
q2 = ￿ q.
We see that, with endogenous prices, ￿rms are not interested in tolerating
product piracy. The reason for this result will be obvious, if we consider
hardware market sizes with endogenous prices. These are b+2a = 1￿b￿2a =
0:5, which is independent of q1 and q2. In words, with endogenous prices,
￿rms are no longer able to win market shares by allowing duplication of
their products. A decrease in copy protection of one ￿rm is countered by a
decrease in price of the other ￿rm￿ s product, which exactly o⁄sets the increase
in market share. As lower copy protection still leads to lower pro￿ts from
software sale, ￿rms determine copy protection at its highest possible value.
145 Partial market covering
In this section we check, whether the model results will change, if some con-
sumers decide not to purchase a product at all. That is, we depart from
the assumption of complete market covering and turn to a model of partial
market covering. Partial market covering will take place, if t is rather large
compared to v. Let us ￿rst determine the identities of consumers who forego
product acquisition. This is a very easy task. If some consumers decide
not to purchase a product at all, these will be the consumers, whose tastes
coincide least with the video games o⁄ered by the single ￿rms. Put di⁄er-
ently, consumers who decide not to purchase any product at all are those,
whose distances to the nearest software ￿rm are highest (at least, if prices
are same for all consoles and video games, respectively, as will be the case
in equilibrium). We then must di⁄erentiate between three possible cases:
In the ￿rst case, j(0:5 ￿ b) ￿ bj is rather low. In words, distances between
neighboring ￿rms do not di⁄er signi￿cantly. Consequently, there should be
non-purchasing consumers between all pairs of neighboring ￿rms. In the sec-
ond case, b is relatively high (and, hence, 0:5 ￿ b relatively low). That is,
the distance between ￿rms 1 and 2 (and between ￿rms 3 and 4) is rather
low. Here, only some consumers between ￿rms 1 and 4 and between ￿rms
2 and 3 forego product purchase. Finally, in the third case, b is rather low
and 0:5 ￿ b high. Thus, distance between ￿rms 1 and 4 (and between ￿rms
2 and 3) is low so that non-purchasing consumers are only located between
￿rms 1 and 2 and between ￿rms 3 and 4. It turns out that the second and
the third case are hardly tractable. We therefore restrict our formal analysis
15to the ￿rst case and o⁄er an informal discussion of the remaining ones.
Let us start with the second stage and the software market.13 We provide
a detailed analysis of the market for software compatible with ￿rm 1￿ s hard-
ware. The analysis of the second software market is completely analogous.
It is important to note that the software market now consists of two discon-
nected sets of consumers, one surrounding ￿rm 1 and another surrounding
￿rm 4. There are consumers being located between these ￿rms who decided
not to purchase hardware at all. Denote the set of consumers surrounding a
￿rm as the ￿rm￿ s neighborhood. It is easy to see that t
v must be so large that
each ￿rm acts as a local monopolist in its neighborhood.14 If this were not the
case, there must be some consumer being indi⁄erent between buying a video
game from ￿rm 1 or ￿rm 4. In equilibrium, this consumer must lie within
one of the neighborhoods, as, otherwise, the ￿rms would deviate from their
initial strategy by increasing prices without su⁄ering a loss in customers. But
then, all non-purchasing consumers had a higher net value from purchasing
software than the indi⁄erent consumer contradicting the assumption that the
latter found it worthwhile to acquire a video games console, while the former
did not. To summarize, each software producer is, in its neighborhood, in a
monopoly position and determines the price for its software without taking
the other ￿rm￿ s software price into account. Hence, both ￿rms face the same
maximization problem so that the respective software prices should be same,
13Note that money spent on hardware is again sunk at this stage.
14Notice that, if t is relatively high compared to v, a ￿rm will simply be unable (or
unwilling) to alienate consumers from the other ￿rm￿ s neighborhood, as these consumers
attach a much higher value to the latter ￿rm￿ s product.
16too. This implies that the two ￿rms￿neighborhoods are of equal size, for a
neighborhood￿ s size is determined by the hardware price, the software price
and the copying probability, and all these variables are equal for both ￿rms.
Let the size of each ￿rm￿ s neighborhood be given by 2f. The neighborhoods
are symmetric with f consumers being located on each side of a ￿rm.
When deriving the optimal software price of a ￿rm, two solutions are
imaginable: In the ￿rst solution, each neighborhood is so large that a monopoly
solution is feasible, that is, each ￿rm can set the price for its product op-
timally, without taking the market size into account. Formally, ￿rm i then
maximizes









will be indi⁄erent between buying and not buying the software, if no copy is




to the above pro￿t formula. Maximizing pro￿t with respect to price, yields















This solution, however, will only be feasible, if the consumer satisfying d =
p v
3t has actually acquired a video games console and, so, does not belong
to the set of non-purchasing consumers. If this is not the case, the farthest
customer in the ￿rm￿ s neighborhood will achieve a rent, i.e. his valuation for
the video game exceeds the monopoly price. It is then optimal to raise the
price such that the farthest customer becomes indi⁄erent between buying
17the ￿rm￿ s software and not buying any software at all. In this way, the
￿rm is paid higher prices for its product and does not su⁄er from a loss in
customers. Formally, the price becomes p = v ￿ tf2 and the corresponding
pro￿t ￿ = (1 ￿ q1)2f (v ￿ tf2). To summarize, depending on how much
customers have acquired hardware, that is, depending on the software market
size, the ￿rms set the price equal to p = max
￿
2v
3 ;v ￿ tf2￿
.
Turn now to the ￿rst stage of the model, where the hardware market is
dealt with. As, in the considered case, some consumers being located in the
segment between ￿rms 1 and 2 decide not to purchase any product at all,
each ￿rm is again in a local monopoly position.15 The two ￿rms thus face
the same maximization problems, and we explicitly derive the solution only
for ￿rm 1. Let us start by assuming that some hardware buyers are not
going to purchase software at the equilibrium price. These customers buy
hardware, while hoping to get a costless copy of their preferred game. From
the discussion of the software market we know that this can only happen, if
software ￿rms are able to achieve the monopoly solution, i.e. if f > dm, as
otherwise even the farthest customer in a ￿rm￿ s neighborhood is willing to
pay for software. Consider, under this assumption, the demand for ￿rm 1￿ s
hardware. The consumer being indi⁄erent between purchasing this hardware






As mentioned before, there are some customers that, although having ac-
quired a video games console, do not purchase a corresponding game so that
15The argumentation behind this result is the same as in the software market.
18they don￿ t incur software acquisition costs, but realize v￿td2 only with prob-
ability q1. Solving the above condition for d yields d =
q
q1v￿k1
q1t . It is then













Pro￿t from software sale is independent of k1, as, at the second stage, ￿rms
realize their monopoly pro￿ts. One can easily show that maximization of ￿1
leads to k1 =
2q1v
3 and d =
p v
3t. Note that d is equal to dm. This, however,
contradicts the assumption that some customers purchase hardware, but no
original software. Thus, in equilibrium, each customer buying hardware must
also be willing to buy original software, if copies are not available. We there-
fore have p = v ￿ tf2, i.e. we are in the second proposed scenario. We turn
to this scenario next.
Suppose now that all hardware buyers will also buy original software, if
copies are unavailable. In this case, the equivalent to condition (11) is16










If, here, a copy is unavailable for a consumer, he always decides to pur-
chase original software. Thus, expected costs from software acquisition are
(1 ￿ q1)(v ￿ tf2) leading to the above expression for the indi⁄erent customer.
Analogously to the preceding analysis, one can derive ￿rm 1￿ s overall pro￿t,














Maximizing this pro￿t leads to k1 =
2q1v
3 as the optimal hardware price.
Reinserting this price into the pro￿t function, we get a reduced form of ￿rm












3 (1 + q1).
From the last expression, it is obvious that overall pro￿t is strictly increasing
in q1. We are therefore able to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Firm 1 sets q1 = ^ q, i.e. it chooses the lowest possible level
of copy protection.
Proposition 2 o⁄ers a very interesting result. Contrary to the case of
full market covering, the ￿rms are now interested in strategically enabling
product piracy. Why is this the case? Note ￿rst that, under the optimal
price, we have f =
p v
3t, i.e. f is independent of q1.17 Hence, ￿rms do
not enable product piracy in order to attract more customers. Enabling
of unauthorized copying serves a di⁄erent purpose here that is connected
with the fundamental transformation described before. Note that, in the
considered model, ￿rms are local monopolists, both in the hardware as well as
in the software market. Yet, the number of customers a ￿rm serves is di⁄erent
17Notice that f =
p v
3t implies p = 2v
3 as the optimal price for software. Hence, the
software markets are just big enough to enable the monopoly solution. In fact, f is
chosen such that we are at the interface of the monopoly solution and the case, where the
farthest customer will be indi⁄erent between buying and not buying software, if copies are
unavailable.
20in each market. Firm 1 provides 4f customers with hardware, but only 2f
customers with software. Thus, the hardware market is more important for
￿rm 1 than the market for software. If ￿rm 1 makes it relatively easy for
its hardware purchasers to copy the compatible video games, pro￿ts from
software sale will clearly decrease, but the willingness to pay for hardware
will increase. It is this last e⁄ect that makes it worthwhile for hardware
producers to enable product piracy. In this way, reservation prices can be
shifted from the rather unimportant software market to the more essential
market for video games hardware.
Before ￿nishing this section, we informally comment on the remaining
two cases mentioned at the beginning of this section. In the second case, the
hardware market is characterized by competition, whereas, in the software
market, ￿rms act as local monopolists. Considering this model structure,
it may be that the results from Proposition 2 do no longer hold. As ￿rm
1 enjoys a monopoly position only in the software market, the relative im-
portance of the hardware market decreases. Further, enabling of product
piracy may again be countered by price reactions of the competing hardware
producer. There are thus countervailing e⁄ects so that it is unclear, whether
or not reservation prices should be shifted from the software to the hardware
market. In the third case, the situation is completely di⁄erent. There, ￿rms
face competition in the software market, but act as local monopolists in the
hardware market. Hence, for ￿rms 1 and 2 the hardware market is certainly
more important than the market for software. Further, prices are set in-
dependently in the hardware market so that the results from Proposition 2
21should hold in this scenario, too.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we dealt with the issue of strategic enabling of product piracy
in the market for video games. We analyzed, under what conditions product
piracy is enabled by hardware producers and when it is not. The main result
was that enabling of product piracy is a device to shift reservation prices
from the software market to the more important market for video games
hardware.
A caveat is necessary at this point. It is usually the case that consumers
will be more willing to purchase a certain video games console, if many games
for this console are available. If this is the case, hardware producers might
additionally be in competition for services of software producing ￿rms. If,
then, a hardware producer enables product piracy, while the other does not,
software ￿rms may decide to solely produce for the latter (especially, when
producing for a second ￿rm entails high costs) so that enabling of product
piracy could have an unmentioned negative e⁄ect that may o⁄set the positive
one.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that there exist further markets to which
the model nicely applies. Consider e.g. the market for sporting events.
An organizer of such an event realizes pro￿ts through two channels, namely
through ticket sale and catering. In sports arenas, some snack bars or restau-
rants are usually run by the organizer, while others are run by private people.
22A consumer who expects to eat and drink something, while attending the
sporting event, will be less willing to pay high ticket prices, if food is rather
expensive. Similarly to the reasoning above, the organizer of the sporting
event might then allow customers to bring their own food to the event to
increase reservation prices for tickets. Lower pro￿ts from catering would be
outweighed by higher pro￿ts from ticket sale.
Appendix
In this Appendix, it is shown that a =
t￿4b2t+4(k2￿k1)￿4btq2(1￿b)+4b2tq1
4t+8bt￿8bt(q1+q2) is
increasing in q1. Di⁄erentiating a with respect to q1 yields:
@a
@q1
> 0 () b(4t + 8bt ￿ 8bt(q1 + q2))+
￿
t ￿ 4b




This inequality can be simpli￿ed to
4(k2 ￿ k1) > 4btq2 ￿ 2bt ￿ t
Note that a ￿ 0. Thus, t￿4b2t+4(k2 ￿ k1)￿4btq2 (1 ￿ b)+4b2tq1 ￿ 0, as the
denominator in a is strictly positive. Transforming the last condition gives
4(k2 ￿ k1) ￿ 4btq2 (1 ￿ b) ￿ 4b2tq1 + 4b2t ￿ t. Hence, @a
@q1 > 0 must always
hold, if 4btq2 (1 ￿ b) ￿ 4b2tq1 + 4b2t ￿ t > 4btq2 ￿ 2bt ￿ t () 2bt(1 ￿ q2) +
t(1 ￿ 2bq1) > 0. This conditions always holds, as both terms in parentheses
are strictly positive. Q.E.D.
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Figure 2. Locations of the two firms in the first software market. 
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